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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts should not apply the plain view doctrine to digital evidence
because the application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence
threatens to nullify Fourth Amendment protection for digital property.'
What constitutes plain view for digital property is still a question of first
impression for most courts. However, several courts have addressed this
issue. These courts have begun to apply the plain view doctrine, or theories
that bear a striking resemblance to the plain view doctrine, in such a manner that transforms searches executed pursuant to a warrant for digital
property into general searches of the digital property. In other words, digital property warrants are transforming into a species of de facto general
warrants. General warrants are bad.2 The Fourth Amendment was designed

to protect against general warrants.

The Fourth Amendment is intended to protect Americans by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.3 Fourth Amendment protection naturally extends to digital property stored on computers and other
electronic storage devices. But, of course, digital property is different from
physical property. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Walser,4 aptly
stated the dilemma:
The advent of the electronic age and ... the development
of desktop computers that are able to hold the equivalent
of a library's worth of information, go beyond the estabThis article uses the term "digital property" to encompass digital data contained on
computers and other electronic storage devices. The term "digital evidence" is used to
distinguish regular digital property from digital property being used or offered as evidence.
2
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 (2005). General
warrants, dubbed "Writs of Assistance" by the British, contributed to American colonial
discontent prior to the American Revolutionary War. Writ of Assistance,
htt ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Writ of Assistance (last visited May 8, 2006).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was created, in part, as a
prophylactic against the evil of general searches. The Fourth Amendment specifically provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Practitioners apply the Fourth Amendment by examining "if evidence is the product of an illegal, government search or seizure of a protected person,
place, or thing" and if it is such a product, then "the evidence is inadmissible against a party
with standing." I EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §
1801 (3d ed. 1998).
4 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
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lished categories of constitutional doctrine. Analogies to
other physical objects, such as dressers or file cabinets, do
not often inform the situations we now face as judges
when applying search and seizure law. This does not, of
course, mean that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to computers and cyberspace. Rather, we must acknowledge the key differences and proceed accordingly.5
The plain view doctrine is precisely such an area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that requires us to acknowledge those key differences and proceed accordingly.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment
that allows police to use evidence found during the execution of a warrant
that is technically outside the scope of the warrant. "To satisfy the plain
view doctrine: (1) the officer must be lawfully in the place where the
seized item was in plain view; (2) the item's incriminating nature was
'immediately apparent;' and (3) the officer had 'a lawful right of access to
6
the object itself."'
Courts have begun grappling with how the plain view doctrine applies to digital evidence and have attempted to define the scope of digital
property search warrants. Police have also begun to grapple with this issue
and various government bodies have issued non-binding search and seizure guidance for computers.7 Unfortunately, case law to date reveals that
searches executed pursuant to warrants covering digital property can easily
transform into general searches of a suspect's digital property.
A key difference between non-digital and digital property is that
police must search all of a suspect's digital property in order to effectively
execute a warrant because of the amorphous nature of digital data. The
combination of the need for comprehensive searches of digital property
and the fact that evidence outside the technical scope of a warrant can be
admitted into evidence via the plain view doctrine causes a digital property
' Id. at 986.
6 United States v. Beatty, 170 F.3d 811, 838 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)).
7 The Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued guidelines, Searching and Seizing Com-

puters and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, in 1994 and updated
those guidelines in July 2002.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (July 2002), available at

http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines]. Interestingly, the DOJ states in the Guidelines that "searching and seizing a computer with a warrant is as much an art as a science." Id.That begs the question: Do we really want our warrants to be "artfully" drafted and executed? Several states have issued their own guidelines;
New Jersey issued guidelines called the Computer Evidence Search & Seizure Manual in
2000. STATE OF N.J. DEP'T OF LAW AND PU3LIC SAFETY, COMPUTER EVIDENCE SEARCH &
SEIZURE MANUAL (2000) [hereinafter NJ Guidelines].
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warrant to transform into a sort of defacto general warrant. Even the Tenth
Circuit's attempt to avoid allowing general searches of digital property by
requiring the police to obtain additional warrants when they find evidence
of crimes outside the scope of the original warrant still results in defacto
general searches because the incriminating evidence has already been uncovered. The implications are startling.
American lives have come to revolve around digital property, as
evidenced by the explosion in computer usage in the United States and the
growing prevalence of the Internet in everyday life. Inevitably, digital
property will become more valuable. Digital property will become more
pervasive. Because of the plain view doctrine, digital property will also
become more incriminating.
This article analyzes how courts apply the plain view doctrine to
warrants for digital evidence. It focuses on digital property contained in
individually owned computers and storage devices. 8 Part II briefly examines the special nature of digital property. Part III examines the logistics of
getting a warrant for digital evidence, focusing especially upon particularity. Part IV analyzes how the plain view doctrine affects the execution of a
digital evidence warrant. Part V discusses three alternative future paths
and compares the benefits that accrue to courts, police, and citizens from:
(1) maintaining the status quo, (2) partially eliminating the application of
the plain view doctrine to digital evidence, or (3) completely eliminating
the application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence. Ultimately,
this article argues that courts should no longer apply the plain view doctrine to warrants for digital evidence. 9
8 This article addresses only digital property owned and controlled by a specific
owner. In the case of personal computers or discrete storage devices, the owner usually
controls the whole device. Digital evidence in other contexts implicates myriad legal issues
that fall outside the scope of this article's focus on digital property controlled by individuals. For example, a search of servers owned by Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") and
other online services for personal information is subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis
that must take into account that a third party is involved. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d
325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding, inter alia, that users of an electronic bulletin board system ("BBS") did not have standing to challenge the seizure of BBS computers and that
BBS users had a diminished expectation of privacy in material posted on the BBS). Other
situations that require special treatment include the distribution of data over public computer networks (e.g. the Internet) and the use of computers at a workplace. Also, noncontent information can be gleaned without examination of the contents of a computer hard
drive. A computer connected to a network has an Internet Protocol ("IP") Address that can
reveal its general location; the IP Address can also reveal the exact location of a computer,
much like a street address for a house, in the case of many permanently connected computers or other computers with static IP Addresses.
9 Professor Orin Kerr has opined: "If everything comes into plain view, the plain view
exception threatens to swallow the rule. Narrowing or even eliminating the plain view
exception may eventually be needed to ensure that warrants to search computers do not
become the functional equivalent of general warrants." Kerr, supra note 2, at 566. Yet
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THE PECULIAR NATURE OF DIGITAL PROPERTY

Undisputedly, digital property is different from the "papers" and
"effects" that the Founding Fathers contemplated when adopting the
Fourth Amendment.' 0 The manifest difference between digital and physical property merits special consideration. Digital storage devices can hold
an enormous quantity of data." The School of Information Management
and Systems at the University of California, Berkeley estimates that about
five exabytes of new information, which is equivalent to 37,000 times the
amount of information in the Library of Congress book collections, was
created in 2002 alone. Of the five exabytes of new information created in
2002, 92% were created and stored on magnetic media, primarily computer hard disks.' 3 The computers that created much of that digital data are
now ubiquitous. The U.S. Census Bureau found that in August 2000 over
half of the households in the United States, fifty-four million households,
had one or more computers.14
People now use computers and other digital devices for almost everything imaginable. Rather than storing images, movies, documents, correspondence, personal records, and a plethora of other personal data in
physical form, people are storing this data in digital media. The physical
world is converging with the digital world. Consequently, it is inevitable
that the amount of digital property created will continue to grow. As digital property becomes embedded in our everyday lives, people envisage the
digital property in a "virtual world" using labels from non-digital physical
property counterparts such as "files," "cabinets," and "desktops."
At first blush, the analogy between physical files and virtual files

Professor Kerr posits that it is too early to abolish the doctrine. Id. at 582-84. This article
argues that warrants for digital property are a species of defacto general warrants and that
the time to eliminate the application of the plain view doctrine to warrants for digital property is now.
10 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 2, at 536-47 (discussing the special nature of digital property and identifying four major differences between searches involving computers and
traditional searches: the environment, the copying process, the storage mechanism, and the
retrieval mechanism). The treatment of digital property in criminal law can be contrasted
with copyright law, which is based on perception. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
11 Cf Britons Growing "Digitally Obese, " BBC NEWS (UK Edition), Dec. 9, 2004,
availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4079417.stm.
12 SCHOOL OF INFO. MGMT. AND SYSTEMS, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, How MUCH
2003 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, availableat http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/

INFORMATION?

research/projects/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
13 Id.
14 ERIC C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND INTERNET USE
IN THE UNITED STATES: AUGUST 2000 1 (2001), availableat www.census.gov/prod/

2001 pubs/p23-207.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
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seems workable, and courts have attempted to use this analogy. 15 However, analogizing virtual objects in a digital storage device with physical
papers and effects is a tenuous proposition. Digital data stored on computers require interfaces and translation in order for a person to perceive
the data. Data is represented numerically and stored on elements that can
be read to interpret zeros and ones. The sheer diversity of information that
can exist in a digital storage device is mind boggling. An object in the
physical world is discrete and is easily separable from the object's physical
location, whereas digital data must be interpreted through machines because one bit looks much like another bit until a machine organizes it into
something useful.
Police cannot see digital property directly. When police look at a
hard drive, they cannot interpret the magnetic charges on the surface of the
disks with their bare eyes. Neither can a police officer see the FowlerNordheim tunneling that links gates within a flash drive's EEPROM
chip. 16 Police cannot see whether digital property is evidence of a crime
without electro-mechanical assistance. One bit "looks" much like another
bit until a machine reads a digital property storage device and a program,
which is also a set of bits, translates the digital property into a perceivable
form that may or may not represent the true nature of the digital property.
Plain view considerations make digital property's special characteristics even more apparent. Is it really plain view if police must "open"
every "file" on a digital storage device in order to see what data is really
contained within that file? Is it really plain view if one has to reconstruct
the bit structure of a file? Are "hidden files" really in plain view? What if
file tables contain incorrect information? When forensic specialists reconstruct files and recover data that a person might assume is permanently
deleted, is that plain view?' 7 What about file size? After all, the size of a
file does not accurately predict its contents; a one kilobyte (1K) file containing child pornography is just as illegal as a one hundred megabyte
(100MB) file containing child pornography. Furthermore, the virtual or
physical labels that purport to describe digital property are not dispositive.
Are encrypted files in plain view? If a police officer is looking for a phone
number among a person's digital property, should the officer only look at
text files, or look to see if there is an image of the phone number or even a

15 E.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (analogizing
computer files with physical files).
I See http://computer.howstuffworks.com/flash-memoryl.htm (last visited Apr. 22,
2006).
17 See The Associated Press, Is Your Cell Phone Spilling Your Secrets?, available at
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/FinancialPrivacy/IsYourCellPhoneSpillingY
ourSecrets.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
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movie of the phone number? 18 These considerations and other factors
make it almost impossible for police to logically restrict a digital property
search because police have to practically search all the digital property
within an electronic storage device in order to effectively execute a search.
Courts have begun to struggle with this reality.
III. OBTAINING A WARRANT FOR DIGITAL PROPERTY
The warrant sets the stage for police to be in a lawful position
where they can take advantage of the plain view doctrine. Therefore, it is
very important to consider how a warrant for digital evidence is issued.
The basic requirements that must be met before a warrant can be issued
are: (1) a neutral magistrate, (2) an oath or affirmation (3) based upon
probable cause, and (4) a description that particularly describes the object
of the search. 19 The requirements that a warrant be supported by an oath or
affirmation and issued by a neutral magistrate do not implicate any special
considerations in the digital property context. However, probable cause
and particularity are affected by the distinctive nature of digital property.
A. Probable Cause
Generally, a court finds probable cause to search when it determines that "the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit
and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises being searched. 20 Probable cause is important in
justifying broad language that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement. 21 Whether there is probable cause depends on the
facts of the case in question.22
In United States v. Hay,23 the Ninth Circuit considered a case in18 A prime example of how data can easily be hidden from search algorithms is the

recent growth of image spam, where the span slips through spain filters because the advertisements are embedded in images that are not text searchable. See Associated Press, More
spam slips thru in new cans, July 2, 2006, available at http://www.nydailynews.conibusiness/story/431912p-363980c.html (last visited July 25, 2006).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). The

validity of a warrant also depends on whether the warrant satisfies controlling rules and
procedures regarding the issuance of warrants. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (providing for
general procedural requirements for federal warrants).
20

21

22

Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925).

See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997).
For a more expansive discussion of probable cause, see 1 EDWARD J.

ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

supra note 7.
23 231 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2000).

IMWINKELRIED

ch. 19 (3d ed. 1998). See also DOJ Guidelines,
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volving a personally owned computer where probable cause supported a
warrant containing boilerplate language. The affidavit attached to the warrant stated "that individuals involved in possession and transportation of
child pornography rarely, if ever, dispose of their sexually explicit material
and that deleted computer files can likely be retrieved by computer experts"; that language was boilerplate language and not fact-specific to the
case. The court held boilerplate language to be sufficient to support probable cause.24
Probable cause for searches of personally owned computers has
also been challenged on the basis of staleness. For example, the court in
United States v. Horn25 confronted the question of whether there was
probable cause for searching a computer based on letters written three
months before the magistrate issued the warrant.26 The Horn court held
that the warrant was not stale because the defendant exhibited a deep and
continuing interest in child pornography; therefore, there was a reasonable
likelihood that he kept some records of correspondence related to child
pornography and that child pornography would probably still be in his
possession.2 7
Digital property requires some special considerations when ascertaining whether there is probable cause, but these considerations raise no
significant hurdles. The particularity requirement, on the other hand, is
more challenging.
B. ParticularityParticularly
Particularity is especially important for warrants for digital property
because particularity delineates the scope of a search. The difficulty that
courts have with particularity for digital evidence presages the difficulty
that courts have with adjudicating questions regarding the execution of
digital evidence warrants and the application of the plain view doctrine.
Particularity mandates that the warrant must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized., 28 In
cases involving searches of digital evidence contained in computers and
other storage devices, when evaluating whether a warrant particularly described the place to be searched and the things to be seized, most courts
have found that broad language allowing the search of all computer
equipment in relation to a particular type of crime is particular enough to
24

25

Id. at 635-36.
187 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999).

26 Id.
27

Id. at 786-87.

28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements. 29 Courts have come to realize
that sophisticated criminals will attempt to hide evidence in myriad ways.
The First Circuit, in United States v. Upham,30 held that a warrant
authorizing a search of "[a]ny and all computer software and hardware,...
computer disks, disk drives .... [a]ny and all visual depictions, in any
format or media, of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct [as defined by the statute]" was valid because:
As a practical matter, the seizure and subsequent offpremises search of the computer and all available disks
was about the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain the images. A sufficient chance of
finding some needles in the computer haystack was established by the probable-cause showing in the warrant application; and a search of a computer and co-located disks is
not inherently more intrusive than the31physical search of
an entire house for a weapon or drugs.
Rather than relying on the justification of searching for a needle in
a computer haystack, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Hall,32 held
that a warrant listing "[h]ardware, computer disks, disk drives, internal
modems, tape drives, disk application programs, data disks, system disk
operating systems" was sufficiently particular because the "items listed on
the warrants were qualified by phrases that emphasized that the items
sought were those related to child pornography" such as "'child pornography,' 'minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct,' and 'sexual conduct
between adults... and minors."' 3 3
The Ninth Circuit has several reported opinions regarding particularity of warrants for computer equipment; these opinions reflect reasoning
similar to that of the Seventh Circuit. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit considered
United States v. Meek.3 4 The Meek court held that a warrant which authorized, inter alia, a search of "computer equipment, computer generated
printouts, data storage devices, and documentation of computer hardware"
was not overbroad because it "specifically referred to items related to the
sexual exploitation of children, describing those items with as much preci-

29

Interestingly, the DOJ Guidelines distinguishes between computers that are instru-

mentalities of a crime and when a computer is "merely a storage device for evidence of
crime." DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7. This distinction does not seem to have much substantive effect on particularity.
30 168 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1999).
31 Id. at 535.
32

142 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998).

" Id. at 995-97.
14

366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004).
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sion as possible. 35 In UnitedStates v. Wong,36 the court reasoned "that the
officers were provided with objective standards alerting them to the items
which could be seized ... search warrant contained a comprehensive list
of twelve items the police expected to find ... directly related to ... murder.",37 The defendant in United States v. Lacy38 argued that a warrant authorizing the seizure of his entire computer system was overbroad. 39 The
Lacy court found that the warrant "contained objective limits to help officers determine which items they could seize-allowing seizure only of
documents linked to [child pornography], for example. ' 4 The Ninth Circuit's opinions reveal a focus on creating an objective standard that considers within a temporal context, i.e. when the warrant is drafted, the government's ability to describe the items to be searched as precisely as possible.
The Tenth Circuit followed the same reasoning as the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits. In Davis v. Gracey,4' the Tenth Circuit held that a warrant
authorizing "equipment... pertaining to the distribution or display of pornographic material in violation of state obscenity laws" was sufficiently
particular because it included only items that were connected to the criminal activity and not items that did not harbor pornography.4 2
Several federal district and state courts have also found warrants
containing broad language to be particular enough.43 The First Circuit
seems to be the only court to explicitly reason that the difficulty of searching a computer justifies broad language in a warrant and that practical concerns dictate that language authorizing the search of all of a computer's
31 Id. at 716.
36 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003).
37 Id. at 837-38. The warrant list included "[a]ny writings or documents... [a]ny maps,

reciepts [sic], or writings, depicting Churchill County, Nevada; and [a]ny and all identification and documents belonging to [murder victim]." Id. at 837. "While Item Nine, which
requested to search the computer and its components to 'obtain data as it relates to this
case,' did not specify the information police expected to find on the computers or the exact
location of the evidence, the content of Item Nine referred to the specific items included in
the warrant list. The specificity of the items listed in the warrant combined with the language in Item Nine directing officers to 'obtain data as it relates to this case' from the computers is sufficiently specific to focus the officer's search." Id.
38 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997).
'9 Id. at 746.
40 Id.
41 111 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997).
42 Id. at 1479.
43 E.g., United States v. Albert, 195 F. Supp. 2d 267, 275-76 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding

that warrant authorizing search of a "computer and all of its related disks, software and
storage devices was sufficiently particular and narrow"); People v. Ulloa, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d
799, 802-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that warrant authorizing search of "computers
[etc.] containing any of the items noted above," which included photographs, videotapes, or
movies of simulated or actual sexual acts, was not overbroad).
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contents is the narrowest language possible. Most courts that have held
that broad warrant language meets the particularity requirement seem to
reason that a connection to a crime is the key factor in finding whether a
warrant is sufficiently particular.
Conversely, several courts, primarily federal courts, have found
certain warrant language to be overbroad and insufficiently particular. The
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kow,4 4 found that a warrant contained
only "vague references to 'fraudulent' transactions and possible disparities
between actual and reported income [and] the warrant failed to give any
45
indication of the alleged crime to which the seized documents pertained.
Additionally, the Kow court found that the government knew where it
could find relevant documents, but omitted from the warrant any detail as
to what was known about the sought-after evidence. Thus, the court held
that the warrant was invalid because it authorized a search of "virtually
every document and computer file."'A6 This holding, though reaching a
contrary result, is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Meek,
Wong, and Lacy because of the focus on whether there is a sufficient description of a specific crime that is correlated with the broad warrant language.
Several federal district courts have also found certain language to
be insufficiently particular. In Arkansas Chronicle v. Easley,4 7 the court
held that a search warrant authorizing a search of, inter alia, "any and all
computer equipment" that contains letters, correspondence, memoranda,
and journals was overbroad when the search was for a video and three still
photographs, even though a crime was specified. 48 This holding is at odds
with the majority of federal appellate and district court opinions because a
crime was asserted. The court was likely influenced by the number of
items that the police seized, which included items that could not contain
photographs or videos because the court noted that the "fruits of the search
confirm the excessive breadth of the warrant, as does the seizure of one
computer belonging to [defendant's] minor child. 'A9
The court in United States v. Clough5° held that a warrant was
overbroad because it contained "no restrictions on the search, no refer44 58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995).
45 Id. at 427.
46

Id.

4' 321 F. Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. Va. 2004).
48 Id. at 793.
49 The police seized: "Eight (8) desktop computers; Two (2) laptop computers; Four

hundred and fifty-four (454) 3.5-inch diskettes; One hundred and seventy (170) CD-Roms;
Eight (8) mini-CD-Roms; Four (4) zip-disks; One (1) hard-drive; Fourteen (14) VHS tapes;
Four (4) notebook binders containing [notes]; One (1) manilla folder with documents inside." Id. at 784-85.
'0 246 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Me. 2003).
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ences to statutes, and no references to crimes or illegality." 5 1 This seems in
line with the requirement of the majority of courts that there be some reference to a specific crime in a warrant. In United States v. Hunter,52 the
court held that a description of computer disks was sufficiently particularized, but the language "[a]ll computers ... [a]ll computer storage devices ...
[and a]ll computer software systems" was a catch-all paragraph that lacked
sufficient limitation. 53 A warrant with the phrases "including but not limited to" and "all" was found to transform a warrant into a general warrant
because it authorized the search of all items on the premises without regard
to the subject matter in Matter of Search Warrant for K-Sports Imports,
Inc.54 The Hunter and K-Sports courts express disapproval of catch-all
phrases because catch-alls essentially make any described limits superfluous. The disapproval of catch-all phrases is consistent with the reasoning
of the majority of courts that a warrant be at least nominally limited.
Generally, courts will find particularity if a crime is associated,
however loosely, with the evidence described in a warrant. In accord, several district courts have held that warrants that do not connect the sought
after evidence to a specific crime are insufficiently particular. However,
two district courts disapprove of the use of catch-all phrases for digital
evidence, which appears to be inconsistent with the holdings of the majority of courts. Thus far only one court, the Arkansas Chronicle court, disfavors broad warrant language as a general rule, but the specific facts of the
case give it limited applicability. Therefore, particularity proves to be a
low hurdle. Police may search all of a suspect's digital property so long as
police remember to assert that a crime is associated with that property. 55
51 Id. at 87-88 (the language in question was "a. text documents of any variety, including e-mail, websites, records of chat sessions, correspondence or shipping records; and b.
digital images of any variety, including still images and videos").
52 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998).
" Id. at 584.
14 163 F.R.D. 594, 596-97 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
55 In practice, some courts interpret even arguably narrow warrant language in ways
that give police remarkable leeway to conduct digital property searches. In United States v.
Gleich, the court held that a search of three computers did not exceed the scope of a warrant because the warrant authorized a search and seizure of items that could contain
"[p]hotographs, pictures, visual representations, or videos in any form that include sexual
conduct by a minor, as defined by [state statute]." 293 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (D.N.D.
2003). In United States v. Musson, the court held that narcotics agents did not exceed the
scope of the warrant in seizing computer disks not described in the warrant because "in the
age of modem technology and commercial availability of various forms of items, the warrant could not be expected to describe with exactitude the precise form the records would
take." 650 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D. Colo. 1986) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d
380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986)). The court in People v. Gall held that laptop computers "were
reasonably likely to serve as 'containers' for writings, or the functional equivalent of 'written or printed material' and therefore fell within the scope of a warrant that authorized the
search of written or printed material." 30 P.3d 145, 153-54 (Colo. 2001). The Gall court
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IV. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE'S EFFECT ON THE EXECUTION OF
DIGITAL WARRANTS
There are many exceptions to the Fourth Amendment such as consent, exigent circumstances, a search incident to arrest, and the plain view
doctrine.56 Among these exceptions, the plain view doctrine has critical
significance for digital property. Under the plain view doctrine "if police
are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful
right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant., 57 The
key question that arises in the digital property context is: What if police
are always in a lawful position after obtaining a warrant and can view everything?
A. Generally

"To satisfy the plain view doctrine: (1) the officer must be lawfully
in the place where the seized item was in plain view; (2) the item's incriminating nature was 'immediately apparent;' and (3) the officer had 'a
lawful right of access to the object itself."' ' 58 During a search of a suspect's
digital property executed pursuant to a broadly worded warrant, a police
officer is arguably "lawfully in a place" where all of a suspect's digital
property is in plain view. 9 If all of a person's digital property is in plain
view, then the application of the plain view doctrine to digital property
searches logically transforms digital property searches into general
searches. Courts are beginning to explicitly apply the plain view doctrine
to digital property and the unfortunate transformation of digital property
also asserted that it was good policy to allow seizure and removal of computers, characterized as sealed containers, for off-site searches because it is less intrusive than on-site
searches. Id.
56 See, e.g., South Carolina Bench Book for Magistrates and Municipal
Court Judges §
C.4.c, availableat http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/trial/magistrate/benchbook/displayBenchBKcontent.cfm?division=CRIM&sec=C&subsection 1=4&subsection2=c (last visited
July 27, 2006).

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); see United States v. Beatty, 170
F.3d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1999).
58 Id. at 838 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)).
59 An interesting argument that a defendant may assert is that though a computer may
be validly seized under a warrant, a second warrant is necessary to search the actual contents of the computer. In United States v. Simpson, the defendant argued that police lacked
the authority to search the seized computer disks and hard drive because the warrant just
authorized the search of the seized computers and not the component parts. 152 F.3d 1241
(10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit rejected that argument and held that computer disks and
hard drives are not closed containers that are "somehow separate from the computers themselves." Id. at 1248.
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searches into general searches is already taking place.
Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have not yet considered
the question of how the plain view doctrine should apply to digital property searches. Of the federal circuit courts, only the Ninth Circuit has directly addressed this issue. In United States v. Wong, 60 the Ninth Circuit
considered the admissibility of evidence related to child pornography that
was found during a search for evidence connected to the disappearance
and murder of the appellant's girlfriend. 6 1 The Wong court held that the
child pornography that was discovered was properly admitted under the
plain view doctrine.62 The court explained: "the police were lawfully
searching for evidence of murder in the graphics files, that they had legitimately accessed and where the incriminating child pornography was
63
located.,
Several federal district courts have applied the plain view doctrine
to admit evidence found outside the technical scope of a warrant. In United
States v. Gray,64 the Eastern District of Virginia held that a Federal Bureau
of Investigation agent "was entitled to examine all of defendant's files to
determine whether they contained items that fell within the scope of the
warrant." That language is very significant. The court explicitly allowed
the examination of all of the defendant's files after the digital property
warrant was issued. The Gray court found that that material outside the
scope of the warrant, which was inadvertently discovered, was admissible
under the plain view exception. 65 In United States v. Nichols,66 an unreported opinion, the Northern District of Indiana considered a case where a
detective came across evidence of child pornography while searching for
evidence of pirated videos.67 The Nichols court seemed to apply the plain
view doctrine, but it also discussed the Tenth Circuit's second warrant
requirement; the Tenth Circuit's warrant requirement is discussed in the
next section of this article.68 The Nichols court expressed approval that the
detective sought a second warrant after discovering the child pornogra-

60 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003).
61
62
63

Id. at 833.
Id. at 838.
Id. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Wong is similar to the Tenth Circuit's reasoning

in Carey and Walser, which are discussed in the following section, but the Tenth Circuit

did not explicitly recognize the applicability of the plain view doctrine to digital property
searches. See infra Part IV.B. Also, unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit did not
require the police to get a second warrant. See infra Part IV.B.
64 78 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Id.at 528-31.
66 No. 2:05-CR-51(01)RM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14747 (N.D. Ind. July 20, 2005).
67 Id.at *-*2.
65

68 Id.at *6-*9 (discussing the plain view doctrine and how the pornographic files were
in plain view).
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phy.69 The child pornography in Nichols was held to be admissible as evidence.70
Another federal court applied the plain view doctrine in the guise of
inevitable discovery. The Southern District of New York, in United States
v. Harding,71 denied a motion to suppress evidence of child pornography
found on a computer disk because, the court reasoned, the agents would
have inevitably discovered the child pornography in executing the part of
the warrant authorizing a search of the disk for evidence of fraud. 72 The
Southern District in that case was incorrect in its application of inevitable
discovery because the only reason the investigators found the material was
because they were searching pursuant to a warrant for fraud. It is not inevitable that police will search a person pursuant to a warrant and there was
no other independent method of discovery mentioned by the Harding
court. The Hardingcourt was likely pondering the plain view doctrine and
thus should have hung its argument on the plain view hook.
The application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence is also
occurring in state courts. The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Frasier v.
State,73 held that images of child pornography found on the defendant's
computer were inadvertently discovered in plain view because, though the
warrant only authorized officers to search a computer for evidence relating
to marijuana, the officer was allowed to open ambiguously labeled and
possibly mislabeled files.74 The People v. Ulloa75 court, in dicta, reasoned
that photographs found on the defendant's computer during the execution
of a warrant authorizing search of "computers [etc.] containing any of the
items noted above," which included photographs, videotapes, or movies of
simulated or actual sexual acts, would have been admissible under the
plain view doctrine. 76 The New York Supreme Court, in People v. Emerson, 77 heard a case where police came across image files clearly labeled as
having child pornography that indeed did contain child pornography. 78 The
Emerson court held that those file names were in plain view. 79 Recently,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided that deleted files were also in

69

Id.

70

Id. at *9.

273 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 420 (the specific words of the court were: "because the agents inevitably would
have discovered their contents in the proper execution of the other portion of the warrant").
73 794 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
74 Id. at 465-66.
71 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
76 Id. at 803-04.
77 1 Misc. 3d 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2,003).
71
72

78 Id.
79

Id. at 641-45.
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plain view.80
A trend is clearly emerging where courts are admitting evidence
found outside the scope of a digital property warrant under the plain view
doctrine. These courts, by admitting evidence outside the scope of a digital
property warrant, have transformed digital property warrants into de facto
general warrants that allow general searches of a particular suspect's digital property. This transformation of digital property warrants increases the
danger of pretextual searches. For example, one possible pretextual search
scenario is for police to target a person by issuing a warrant for "illegal
possession and distribution of copyrighted materials."'', There is almost
certainly probable cause to search nearly every computer in the United
States for copyright infringement because of the very nature of computers
and how computers are used today. 82 Once the warrant is issued, everything on the computer or on other storage devices may be searched and
used against the targeted person. The danger from these de facto general
warrants for digital property will increase as time passes and more of our
lives is recorded and stored in digital property. Several courts have tried to
mitigate this risk by limiting digital property warrants.
B. The Tenth Circuit'sAvoidance of the Plain View Doctrine
The Tenth Circuit has heard two digital property cases that have
drawn the attention of many courts and commentators. 3 The two cases,
United States v. Carey84 and United States v. Walser, 5 implicated the plain
view doctrine, but the court avoided the application of the plain view doctrine in both cases. The Tenth Circuit's failure to address the plain view
doctrine, despite its obvious applicability, makes its reasoning in these
cases problematic. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's approach is problematic because it focused on the subjective intent of police, which is contrary
to United States Supreme Court precedent8 6 Moreover, the requirement
for a second warrant that emerged in the Carey- Walser cases still results in
80

Rosa v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) ("We hold that the

officer acted reasonably in opening the picture files and that the deleted files were in plain
view.").
81 See United States v. Nichols, No. 2:05-CR-51(01)RM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14747, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 20, 2005).
82 A person operating a computer can easily infringe a copyright, even unintentionally.
See http://www.respectcopyrights.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
83 See, e.g., David J.S. Ziff, Note, FourthAmendment Limitations on the Execution of
Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 841, 869

(2005).
84

172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).

85 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
86

See Ziff, supra note 83, at 852-61 (criticizing the "Carey-Winick" approach).
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the transformation of digital property warrants into de facto general warrants.87

The Tenth Circuit in Carey held that police exceeded the scope of
the search warrant by extending a search for evidence of drug trafficking
into a search for child pornography. The search warrant authorized a
search of the defendant's computer for evidence of drug trafficking. 8 The
officer who searched the defendant's computer opened an image file containing child pornography; after opening that file, the officer then spent
five hours searching for more child pornography and "temporarily abandoned" his search for evidence relating to drug trafficking. 89 The court
held that the officer exceeded the scope of the search warrant because the
officer knew, or at least suspected, that he would find evidence not related
to drug trafficking in the JPG image files, i.e., child pornography. 90 The
court did not opine as to what exactly constituted plain view in the context
of computer files, but noted that the images were in "closed files" and
therefore the plain view doctrine did not apply. 91 The court stated:
Although the question of what constitutes "plain view" in
the context of computer files is intriguing and appears to
be an issue of first impression for this court, and many
others, we do not need to reach it here. Judging this case
only by its own facts, we conclude the items seized were
not authorized by the warrant. Further,
they were in closed
92
files and thus not in plain view.
The court limited its holding to the files that the officer opened after discovering the first pornographic image. 9 3 The officer's critical mistake, in the Tenth Circuit's view, was in not obtaining a second warrant
once he discovered the child pornography.
The Tenth Circuit further elaborated on Carey in Walser. The
Walser court held that an officer did not exceed the scope of a warrant,
which authorized a search for evidence of drug trafficking, by opening and
viewing a video file containing child pornography.9 4 The officer used a
87 We cannot rely on police officers to respect a suspect's privacy by refraining from
requesting a second warrant. A diligent police officer would just have to make sure that she
gets a second warrant when she finds out-of-scope evidence.
88 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272-73 (specifically, the warrant was for "names, telephone
numbers, ledgers, receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the
sale and distribution of controlled substances.").
Id. at 1273.
90 Id. at 1274-75.
89

91

92
93

Id. at 1273.
Id.

Id. at 1273 n.4.

94 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 987 (10th Cir. 2001).
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"clear search methodology" by "search[ing] for relevant records in places
where such records might logically be found. 9 5 The officer came across a
file with a ".avi" extension and opened it.96 After opening the video file
and confirming his belief that it contained child pornography, the officer
suspended his search and went to a magistrate judge to obtain a new warrant. 97 The Tenth Circuit focused on the fact that the officer inadvertently
discovered the file.98 The court did not explicitly refer to the plain view
doctrine, but its "inadvertent discovery" reasoning seems strikingly similar
to the plain view doctrine. The court noted approvingly that the officer
"showed restraint by returning to the magistrate for a new warrant before
commencing a new search for evidence of child pornography." 99 The officer in Walser did not make the same "mistake" as the officer in Carey.
There are several defects in the Carey and Walser opinions. These
defects arise from the Tenth Circuit's reluctance to directly address the
application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence. Instead, the
Tenth Circuit inappropriately adjudicated Carey and Walser by ignoring
the technical realities of computer forensics, departing from precedent, and
adding a superfluous easy-to-circumvent procedure.
First, the Tenth Circuit mistakenly avoided the application of the
plain view doctrine in Carey and Walser. The plain view doctrine clearly
applied in both cases because in each case all elements of the doctrine
were satisfied. In both Carey and Walser (1) the officer was lawfully viewing the contents of a suspect's digital property where the file was in plain
view; (2) the file's incriminating nature was immediately apparent because
the officer had to view the file; and (3) the officer had a lawful right of
access to the file because of a warrant. However, the Tenth Circuit expressed distaste about applying the plain view doctrine and applied a
"closed file" construct. The court's distaste may have stemmed from the
investigator's obvious deviation from the literal scope (sans exceptions) of
the warrant and the fact that applying the plain view doctrine to digital
property warrants logically results in general searches. However, the abandonment theory and the "closed file" construct articulated by the Tenth
Circuit do not recognize the reality that police must comprehensively
search a suspect's digital property in order to properly execute a warrant.
Data can be hidden in myriad ways, such as mislabeling, encryption, and
95 Id. at 986. The officer first searched the "My Documents" folder and then the "Recycle Bin." Id. The officer then searched the "Microsoft Works" subfolder in the "Program
Files" folder because of the belief that Microsoft Works is a spreadsheet program and that
drug trafficking records would be kept in that folder. Id.
6 Id. at 987.
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Walser, 275 F.3d at 987.
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deletion. 00 The only search methodology that is thorough is a complete
search of digital property. There is no perfect search tool that can restrict
its search just to the evidence related to a particular crime. 1' The Tenth
Circuit does not recognize the reality that police must search every file. If
police must search all of a suspect's digital property, then there can be no
inadvertence or abandonment in discovering evidence.' 02
Second, the Tenth Circuit improperly focused on the subjective intent of the police searching the defendant's digital property in developing
the abandonment theory. 0 3 The Tenth Circuit overlooked the clear instruction from the United States Supreme Court in Horton v. California:
[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the
application of objective standards of conduct, rather than
standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of
the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item
of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a
search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a

1oo See supra Part II; infra Part IV.C.

1 See infra Part V.B.
102The Tenth Circuit, upon petition for rehearing of Carey, stated:

Because the government contends we failed to properly follow Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990), we recognize inadvertance [sic] is
not a Fourth Amendment requirement. We note, however, "inadvertance is
a characteristic of most legitimate 'plain-view' seizures." Id. As such, the
fact that Detective Lewis did not inadvertently come across the pornographic files is certainly relevant to our inquiry. Our holding is based,
however, on the fact that Detective Lewis impermissibly expanded the
scope of his search when he abandoned the search for drug-related evidence to search for evidence of child pornography. The petition for rehearing is denied.
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277-78. The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The suggestion that the inadvertance [sic] requirement is necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest
is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it "particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized," and that a warrantless search be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.
Horton, 496 U.S. at 139-40 (citations omitted). The syllabus that prefaces Horton summarizes succinctly, "even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate 'plainview' seizures, it is not a necessary condition." Id. at 130 (syllabus to the case). Yet, the
Tenth Circuit managed to incorporate inadvertence into its abandonment theory.
103Other commentators have also noted this deficiency. See Ziff, supra note 83 at 85357 (criticizing the reasoning in Carey because of a restrictive warrant interpretation and
focus on subjective intent).
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From an objective viewpoint, police must search all of the contents
of a suspect's digital property described in a warrant in order to ascertain
the true nature of the contents. Paraphrasing the United States Supreme
Court and applying the fact pattern from Carey, the fact that the investigator in Carey fully expected to find child pornography during the course of
a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search was within the terms
of a warrant or a valid exception, e.g., the plain view doctrine.
Third, the Tenth Circuit's avoidance of the plain view doctrine in
Carey and Walser is unsuccessful because the resulting jurisprudence
merely adds an easy-to-meet procedural requirement that is functionally
equivalent to the plain view doctrine. The additional procedural step of
getting another warrant for evidence unrelated to the crime covered by the
first warrant provides little protection. Law enforcement has quickly
adapted to the Carey and Walser jurisprudence. An example of this adaptation can be found in the DOJ Guidelines, which states that "agents
should obtain a second warrant to search a computer seized pursuant to a
valid warrant if the property targeted by the proposed search is different
from that underlying the first warrant."10 5 The second warrant requirement
provides little protection because the police would have alreadyfound the
out-of-scope evidence, and getting the second warrant would just be standard operating procedure. Thus, unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit's attempt
at solving the digital property warrant scope conundrum still results in
general searches of digital property.
C. Illusory Limits to the Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine is potentially circumscribed by a number of
possible limitations. These potential limits include: whether file labeling or
specific file types are limiting factors during a search; whether law enforcement may search deleted files; whether the search of a computer
should be conducted on-site, the hard drive mirrored, or the computer
seized to be searched off-site; and how much time is allowed for searches
of seized computers. These limits do not effectively stop digital property
warrants from becoming a type of defacto general warrant.

'0
105

496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (6-3 opinion Stevens, J.) (emphasis added).
DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7.
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1. File Labeling and File Types
Courts may limit police to searching only certain file types or force
police to rely on the veracity of file labels. 10 6 The advantage to limiting
police searches based on file name or type is that a clear standard can be
articulated. Yet there are many disadvantages to hobbling police in such a
way. Criminals can easily hide evidence by mislabeling files.'0 7 It is
unlikely that a suspect will label a file "evidence-of-a-crime.doc" or some
other variation that clearly indicates that the file contains pertinent evidence. Additionally, evidence of a crime can be found in almost any type
of file. A phone number can exist in an image, in a video, in a document,
in a spreadsheet, and in any other type of digital file. There are also a dizzying number of file extensions, which continue to grow as more programs
are developed, further supporting the contraindication of file type restrictions. 108 If police were to rely on directory or file labels, then the police
would only catch criminals who accurately label their digital property;
should police only catch careless criminals? Initially, some courts attempted to restrict searches by relying on file labels and file types, but now
courts generally allow the opening and viewing of almost any file within
digital property.
Among the federal circuit courts, the Tenth Circuit has come the
closest to addressing dependence on file types and file names. The court
tangentially addressed file labeling in Carey, where it found that an officer
exceeded the scope of a warrant by opening an image file labeled ".jpg"
while looking for documentary evidence of drug trafficking. 0 9 The reasoning in Carey seems to imply that the police should have relied on the file
labels. Later, in Walser, the Tenth Circuit found that searching an ".AVI"
file for evidence of drug trafficking was appropriate." 0 Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit did not directly address the file type/name issue, but its
treatment of the search in Walser indicates flexibility regarding file types.
Only one court has explicitly restricted a search based on file label-

106

This article uses the terms "file label" and "file type" to encompass all descriptive

data that describes attributes or identifies digital property or discrete parts of digital property0oe.g., headers, directory names, file properties).
See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7 ("The targeted files may be mislabeled, hidden,
oddly configured, written using code words to escape detection, encrypted, or otherwise
impossible to find"); see also Ziff, supra note 83, at 864 (discussing innocuously or ambiguously named files).
8 FILExt, a website cataloging computer file extensions, has over 22,800 records
correlating file extensions with computer programs. http://filext.com/
(last visited Oct. 24,
2006).

1 See supra Part IV.B.
o See supra Part IV.B.
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ing. In People v. Carratu,11 a New York state court gave great weight to
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Carey and adopted much of that court's
reasoning. The Carratu court found that the officer, during a search for
evidence related to an illegal cable box operation, expected to find out-ofscope material related to fake identification when the officer opened a
folder labeled "Fake I.D." ' 1 2 The court held that a search of a folder labeled "Fake I.D." was beyond the scope of the warrant because it was unambiguously labeled and "the name of the folder clearly indicated that it
likely contained false identification documents rather
than documents or
'
records concerning the sale of illegal cable boxes." 13
A majority of courts that have addressed file labeling acknowledge
the fact that files may be mislabeled and that information may exist in
various file types. The Central District of California pithily stated: "There
is no way to know what is in a file without examining its contents, just as
there is no sure way of separating talcum from cocaine except by testing
4
it.,,11
In Gray, the Eastern District of Virginia acknowledged the possibility that suspects may intentionally mislabel files by accepting the assertion
that the agent "knew from his experience that computer hackers often intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously named directories." ' 1 5 The Gray court held that: "In searching
for the items listed in the warrant, [the police officer] was entitled to examine all of defendant's files to determine whether they contained items that
fell within the scope of the warrant."'" 6 The Southern District of New York
found in Harding that
personal computers typically allow a user to assign any desired
three letter file extension to any file, regardless of the nature of
the content of the file .... A personal computer user could assign file names including file extensions, such as 'jpg,' that
conventionally are used to indicate graphic data files to files
that contain text." 17
In United States v. Abbell, 118 the Southern District of Florida also
addressed the issue of seized floppy disks with labels containing descripl 755 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).

Id. at 804-05. Interestingly, the Carratucourt did not limit its holding, like the Carey
court did, to the files opened after the officer initially discovered that there may be evidence of wrongdoing outside the scope of the warrant. Id. at 808.
113 Id. at 808-09.
112

114

United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

115 United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999).
116

Id.

17

273 F. Supp. 2d at 424.

118 963 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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tions of subjects that did not fall under the scope of the warrant. The court
held that the resulting evidence discovered on those disks was admissible
because the officer was not required to assume that the labels accurately
described the contents of the disks. 1 9 Additionally, the Indiana Court of
Appeals, in Frasierv. State,'20 held that a warrant that authorized an officer to search a computer for evidence relating to marijuana allowed the
officer1 to open ambiguously labeled files because of potential mislabel12
ing.
Most courts that have opined regarding the file descriptions debate
have allowed police to search all files in a suspect's piece of digital property. The New York Supreme Court is the only court to unequivocally hold
that a search exceeds the scope of a warrant if the search extends to files
labeled with descriptions that do not match the warrant's description of
evidence sought. 122 In practice, courts will likely allow officers to search
all files within a particular piece of digital property because suspects may
mislabel files or otherwise
attempt to hide files that may actually be within
23
the scope of a warrant.1
2. Deleted Files
Another possible limit to digital property searches occurs when
suspects "delete" files; however, contained within every computer is a
hidden trove of deleted files that many people believe are unrecoverable.
Forensic examination by computer experts can recover many of these deleted files. 124 It seems to be general practice for police to attempt to recover deleted files using computer programs designed to recover such
files, such as EnCase®. 125 Significantly, the DOJ and New Jersey Guidelines both contemplate the use of forensic analysis to recover deleted
files.

126

The First Circuit directly addressed this issue in United States v.
Upham.127 In Upham, the court held that the recovery of deleted files from
"' Id. at 1201.
120 794 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
121Id. at 465-66.

122 Please note that New York Supreme Courts are courts of original instance within
New York, and the New York Court of Appeals is the highest court in New York. New
York State Unified Court System, Court Structure availableat
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ courts/structure.shtml (last visited June 26, 2006).
123 The DOJ Guidelines addresses the issue of potential mislabeling in part B. 1.b. and
part B. 1.c step 3 in the drafting section. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7.
124 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7, at part B. 1.c step 3.
See, e.g., Rosa v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E. 2d 92, 94 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
Id.; NJ Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18.
121 168 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1999).
125
126
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a computer and from diskettes was within the scope of the warrant. The
warrant authorized a search of "[a]ny and all computer software and hardware, . . . computer disks, disk drives .... [a]ny and all visual depictions,
in any format or media" of underage minors. 128 The files from the diskettes
were recovered using the undelete function of the computer, and the files
from the formatted hard disk were recovered using a special utility program. 129 The court reasoned that the recovery of deleted files "after attempted destruction, is no different than decoding a coded message lawfully seized or pasting together scraps of a tom-up ransom note."' 30 The
Ninth Circuit briefly mentioned deleted files in its analysis of probable
cause for a warrant in United States v. Hay;13' it held that probable cause
for a warrant was still supported six months after a transmission of child
pornography, in part because computer experts could recover deleted

files.

132

In Commonwealth v. Copenhefer,133 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a defendant's "unsuccessful attempt to delete documents
or files from his computer did not create a legally protected expectation of
privacy which would have required a second warrant before the prosecution applied technology to elicit the content of files buried in the memory
of the computer."' 134 These cases indicate that courts are likely to find that
deleted files are within the scope of a search warrant. Thus, the deleterious
effects of the plain view doctrine extend to digital property that people
consider deleted.
3. On-site Search, Mirroring, or Seizure
Restrictions on police "seizure" of digital property are possible limits to the plain view doctrine. One possible restriction is location, i.e.,
whether police are restricted to the site where the digital property is located. Another is whether police may mirror or merely seize the digital
property for perusal offsite. If the police are permitted to search at their
leisure, then the potential for abuse of the plain view doctrine increases.
Among reported cases, courts have generally allowed seizure of computers
128Id. at 535.
129 Id. at 537.
130 Id. Interestingly,

the government made a novel argument attempting to analogize file
deletion with "putting one's trash in the street where it can be searched by every passerby," but the court rejected this abandonment argument. Id. at 537 n.3.
131231 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2000).
132 Id. at 636.
133 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777
A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001).
134

Id. at 1355-56.
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for searching material off-site without reviewing the contents of the computer at the site where the computer was seized. The courts seem to be
primarily concerned with the technical nature of the evidence and the difficulty of segregating files on-site.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Henson,' 35 held that it was
reasonable for law enforcement to seize a large amount of documents and
computer files without first segregating the material outside the scope of
the warrant. 116 The court noted that "it was inevitable that the officers
would seize documents that were not relevant to the proceedings at hand"
because "the extensive seizure of records was authorized by the terms of
the warrant."' 137 The court found that it was "unreasonable to require officers to sift through the large mass of documents and computer files found
... in an effort to segregate those few papers that were outside the war138
rant."
In Mahlberg v. Mentzer, 139 the Eighth Circuit briefly touched on
the scope of a warrant to search for computer software while reviewing a
district court's denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion. The warrant in
question listed two programs with serial numbers as the objects of the
search.140 The officer that executed the warrant testified that he seized all
the computer disks that were found because he did not know which disks
held the evidence being sought and because he was told that the defendant
might booby-trap the disks to erase themselves if examined on the defendant's computer.1 41 The court held that the officer's testimony was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that the
seizure of all the computer disks
42
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 1
Several federal district courts have also addressed the issue of
whether police have to search computers at the site of seizure. In United
States v. Gawrysiak,143 the court held that seizure of all of a defendant's
135 848 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir. 1988).

Id. at 1383-84.
137Id. at 1383. The warrant authorized a search of "any and all records, but not limited
136

to modules, modems and connectors, computer, computer terminals, hard copy user documentation pertaining to files and/or programs, cables, printers, discs, floppy discs, tapes,
vendor phone numbers, all original and backup tapes and discs, any other informational
data input, all vendor manuals for hardware and software, printouts..." Id.at 1382. The
Sixth Circuit relied on similar reasoning in United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir.

1997). The Frost court held that the extensive seizure of paper and computer documents
was authorized by the warrant because of the complex nature of a mail fraud case. 125 F.3d
at 388.
Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383-84.
139 968 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1992).
138

'40Id. at
141 Id. at
142 Id. at

774.
776.
775-76.

143972 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.J. 1997).
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computer files by copying the files onto disks for off-site search without
prior review was appropriate because the "agents acted with good faith and
with the intent to carry out the search in an appropriate and efficient manner." 44 In United States v. Yung, 145 the court held that a seizure of items
including computer files without an individual review prior to the completion of the search did not invalidate the search because the executing officers acted in good faith in attempting to stay within the boundaries of the
warrant and because the extensive seizure of the items "was prompted
largely by practical considerations and time constraints."'' 46 Clearly, courts
have been giving police considerable leeway to search digital property at
their leisure.
4. Time Limits
Placing time limits on searches potentially decreases the danger of
abuse of the plain view doctrine. The Fourth Amendment does not place
any specific time limit on how long a seized computer can be held by the
government for a search. An implicit time limit can generally be extrapolated from the protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that searches
be executed within ten days of obtaining a warrant, but this has not been
applied to searches of seized computers. 147 There is very little reported
case law regarding how long a computer can be held by police. The longer
that police can scrutinize digital property, the greater the possibility that
the police will find something that could be admissible via the plain view
doctrine.
In United States v. Syphers,148 police detained a computer for seven
months before completing a search of the computer. The court found that
there was "an 'overwhelming backlog' in the investigation of computer
crime by the state police."' 149 The court also found that the search was
completed five months ahead of the deadline specified in the warrant extension. The court held that the seven month period of detention was conacted in good faith in light of the backlog and
stitutional because the police
150
complexity of the search.
144

Id. at 866.

45786 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Kan. 1992).

146

Id. at 1569 (citation omitted).

147FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
148 296 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.N.H. 2003).
49 Id.at 58.
150Id.The Syphers court cited United States v. Greene, 56 M.J. 817 (N.M. Ct. Crim.

App. 2002), to support its holding. In Greene, consent was given to seize and search a
computer and the court found that three months was a reasonable time period for examining
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In contrast, the search in United States v. Brunette'51 was held to be
too long. The warrant had a sixty day time limit. The court held that the
government failed to abide by the time limit in the search warrant when a
computer was searched sixty-two days after the warrant was issued. The
court allowed suppression of the evidence that was gathered after the time
limit expired.152 Brunette is distinguishable from Syphers because the investigators in Syphers requested an extension of time for the warrant and
kept within the time limit allowed by that extension.
The DOJ Guidelines reports that some magistrate judges have begun imposing time limitations on searches of computers:' 53
Several magistrate judges have refused to sign search warrants authorizing the seizure of computers unless the government conducts the forensic examination in a short period of time, such as thirty days. Some magistrate judges
have imposed time limits as short as seven days, and several have imposed specific time limits when agents apply
for a warrant to seize computers from operating businesses. In support of these limitations, a few magistrate
judges have expressed their concern that it might be constitutionally "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment
for the government to deprive individuals of their computers for more than a short period of time. Other magistrates have suggested that Rule 41's requirement that
agents execute a "search" within 10 days of obtaining the
warrant might apply to the forensic analysis5 of
the com4
puter as well as the initial search and seizure.
These time limits reportedly being imposed may significantly limit
the ability of law enforcement to search for plain view evidence outside
the technical scope of a warrant and may also significantly limit the ability
of law enforcement to search for evidence within the technical scope of a
warrant. Because of the paucity of information, the reported reluctance on
the part of some magistrate judges has an uncertain impact on the application of the plain view doctrine.

the computer. 56 M.J. at 822-23.
15176 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D. Me. 1999).
152
153
154

Id. at 42.
DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part 1I.D.2.
DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part II.D.2.

58
D.
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Limited Protection Against the Plain View Doctrine

Although the plain view doctrine for digital property is generally
unhindered by concerns such as file labeling, file deletion, seizure, or time
limits, there are some narrow protections for certain types of digital property. These narrow limits on the plain view doctrine are professional privileges and statutory First Amendment based protections.
1. Professional Privilege
Lawyers and other professionals work with a great deal of privileged information. This material may include attorney-client correspondence, medical records, and other sensitive information. It is natural for
these professionals to work with and save privileged material on their personally owned computers. Additionally, it is highly likely that clients of
these professionals may have stored privileged material on their personal
computers. Privileged material enjoys legal protections that may be abrogated by the broad scope of search warrants.
DOJ Guidelines provide some guidance regarding the handling of
privileged material. 55 The DOJ Guidelines express a slight preference for
using "Taint Teams" that review material, independent from the prosecution, for privileged material. In United States v. Crim. Triumph Capital
Group,156 the District of Connecticut held that "[t]he use of a taint team is
a proper, fair and acceptable method of protecting privileged communications when a search involves property of an attorney."' 5 7 Though taint
teams can protect privilege, the use of taint teams is neither mandatory nor
uniform across jurisdictions, and privileged material may still be revealed
during a search for unrelated material. There is a dearth of cases regarding
privilege in connection with digital property plain view doctrine; therefore,
it is very difficult to gauge whether privilege provides real protection for
privileged digital property.

2. The Privacy Protection Act
The Privacy Protection Act ("PPA") protects certain classes of material that implicate the First Amendment, such as material compiled by

155 DOJ

Guidelines, supra note 7, at Part II.B.7.

156 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002).
117Id. at 43.
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the press.' 58 The Senate Committee report accompanying the PPA explained its purpose:
[T]he purpose of this statute is to limit searches for materials held by persons involved in First Amendment activities who are themselves not suspected of participation in
the criminal activity for which the materials are sought,
and not to limit the ability of law enforcement officers to
search for and seize materials held by those
suspected of
59
investigation.1
under
crime
the
committing
Section 2000aa(a) of Title 42, United States Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a
government officer or employee, in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to
search for or seize any work product materials possessed
by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or
other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce; but this provision shall
not impair or affect the ability of any government officer
or employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable law, to
search for or seize such materials .. 160
The PPA contains significant exceptions.1 61 Some exceptions from
PPA protection include searches of contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits
of a crime.' 62 Perhaps the most significant limitation of the PPA is that it
only protects third-parties, not suspects. Thus, the PPA provides very limited protection that does not adequately discourage general searches of a
suspect's digital property.
V.

THE FUTURE OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR DIGITAL
EVIDENCE

The plain view doctrine, as currently constructed, is a danger to
personal liberty when applied to digital property searches. There are three
possible paths forward. 163 Courts could: (1) maintain the status quo, (2)
15842 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa- 2000aa-12 (2003).

1 S. REP. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980), as reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950.
160 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a).
16' The DOJ Guidelines contain a detailed examination of the PPA. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 7.
162 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7.
163 This article will not explore the possibility of ex ante restriction. See Kerr, supra
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partially eliminate the application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence, or (3) completely eliminate the application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence.
A. Maintainingthe Status Quo
Courts could maintain the status quo and apply the plain view doctrine accordingly. There are some benefits to maintaining the status quo.
Courts do not have to break with precedent covering non-digital property,
where applying the plain view doctrine is commonplace and unexceptional. There would be no need to alter existing jurisprudence and no need
to treat digital property differently. Maintaining the status quo would allow
police to search everything on a computer and use everything found as
evidence. Police could then make comprehensive searches of digital property a standard operating procedure and thereby increase their ability to
obtain useful evidence. In jurisdictions that follow the Tenth Circuit's second warrant requirement, police could easily circumvent that protection by
making comprehensive searches of digital property a standard operating
procedure and train their officers to obtain a second warrant whenever a
new crime is found. In fact, the DOJ Guidelines already suggest that approach. Moreover, society might benefit from the increased likelihood of
successful prosecutions of criminals.
There is, however, a strong argument against maintaining the status
quo. The negative aspects of maintaining the status quo have been discussed in detail throughout this article, most notably in Part IV. In brief,
the application of the plain view doctrine to evidence found during the
execution of a digital property warrant creates a species of defacto general
warrants. General searches are bad. Courts that apply the plain view doctrine to digital evidence condone police action that violates the Fourth
Amendment. Courts that apply alternative reasoning, similar to that of the
Tenth Circuit, will still create a type of de facto general warrants. The
status quo gives police great power that could possibly be abused. The
clich6 "absolute power corrupts absolutely" comes to mind. Under the
status quo, police can easily conduct "fishing expeditions," i.e., pretextual
searches where police may charge a person with a minor crime in order to
get a digital property warrant, and then charge that 16person
with any crime
4
property.
digital
the
of
search
the
during
discovered
note 2, at 571-76 (arguing that the application of ex ante restrictions to the digital plain
view doctrine is inappropriate). The author agrees with Professor Kerr that digital property
searches call for ex post standards, not ex ante rules.
164 It is important to note that the exclusionary rule is designed to prevent injury to the
person. The Supreme Court has stated that "the [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created
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Currently, child pornography is the crime that has been implicated
in most of the reported cases dealing with the application of the plain view
doctrine to digital evidence. In these cases, the heinous nature of child
pornography masks the potential danger from general searches. In the future, however, people's use of computers for non-pornographic purposes
will undoubtedly increase. Thus, as digital property and people's lives
converge, the danger to privacy and liberty from general searches of digital
property will grow. Although there is some merit to maintaining the status
quo, the argument against the status quo is strong, especially because the
status quo violates the spirit of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, maintaining the status quo is unacceptable.
B. PartiallyEliminating the Plain View Doctrinefor DigitalEvidence
Courts and commentators have conceived of a number of ways to
limit the adverse effects of the plain view doctrine for digital evidence.
This section will examine some of these possible mitigating methods,
which include: (1) subjective intent limitations; (2) use of digital property
search tools; (3) limiting evidence to particular forensic steps; (4) limits by
the type of crime; (5) using an "immediately apparent" standard; and (6)
limits based upon the type of defendant.
One possible way of mitigating the effects of digital plain view is
to rely on the subjective intent of the investigating officer, i.e., whether the
police expected to find evidence outside the scope of the original digital
property warrant. Under a pure subjective intent standard, courts would
have to divine the intent of police during a particular search. If an investigator expected to find evidence outside the technical scope of the warrant
at any time during the search, then that evidence would be inadmissible.
Otherwise the plain view doctrine would apply and the evidence would be
admissible. The Tenth Circuit implemented a variation of this approach
with an additional step of obtaining a second warrant when out-of-scope
evidence was found. 165 An obvious weakness of the subjective intent approach is that people, including police officers, can lie. Also, police can
remove subjective intent from the equation by making comprehensive
searches standard operating procedure. 166 Perhaps the strongest argument
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Eliminating the incentive for pretextual searches
would have a deterrent effect.
65 The specific flaws of the Tenth Circuit's approach are detailed in Part IV.B.
66 United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526-27 (E.D. Va. 1999); see Kerr, supra
note 2, at 578-79 ("Proving intent is particularly problematic in the computer context because government agencies can set policies that mandate very thorough forensic investiga-
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for not using subjective intent as a limitation is that the United States Supreme Court has specifically disapproved of subjective intent.167 The
United States Supreme Court explicitly stated: "[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of
conduct, rather than168standards that depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the officer.,
Another possible method of limiting the plain view doctrine is for
courts to dictate the use of only certain search tools. Police use a variety 1of
69
search tools when searching digital property such as EnCase® Forensic
and Forensic Toolkit®.170 Without going into technical detail, these search
tools are computer programs that search based on specific criteria. These
utilities are flawed because computers and other digital property continue
to evolve. At least one court has noted the flaws of such search tools; the
Harding court notes how "carving utilities," which search based on file
characteristics, are flawed because data can exist in numerous formats,
e.g., text converted into images. 17 In any case, courts would have to
choose among the gamut of forensic software programs and perhaps even
set up certification systems; having the courts choose which software
search tools are adequate is impractical. Professor Kerr wrote about a theoretical "Perfect Tool" that could "magically locate evidence in a warrant."'172 That Perfect Tool would help police enormously and obviate the
need for searching through a suspect's property with a fine tooth comb.
Unfortunately, a Perfect Tool will likely never exist because technology
will continue to evolve and hackers will find ways around search algorithms. 73 In order to adequately search digital property, police will have to
examine everything.
Professor Kerr has also examined the possibility of assessing admissibility based on the reasonableness of particular forensic steps. 174 The
difficulty with limiting searches by forensic step is that courts would have
to determine whether a forensic step is inappropriate on a case by case
basis. 175 Ad hoc determinations would likely cause confusion about the
tions. For example, the FBI has generally trained its forensic analysts to conduct highly
comprehensive examinations; the default practice is to leave no digital stone unturned.").
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,138-39 (1990).
168 Id. at 138.
169 See Rosa v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E. 2d 92, 94 (Va. Ct. App. 2006);
http://www.guidancesoftware.com /products/efindex.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
170 http://www.accessdata.com/products/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
171United States v. Harding, 273 F. Supp. 2d 411,424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
172 Kerr, supra note 2, at 569-70, 579.
173 Kerr, supra note 2, at 570 ("If Perfect Tool were invented, hackers would quickly
devise a counterstrategy to disable it.").
74Kerr, supra note 2, at 579.
75Professor Kerr dismissed using reasonableness of a forensic step as a solution be-

2007]

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE

63

acceptable limits of searches because courts would likely apply this standard unevenly. Police will probably be more conservative and reduce the
scope of their searches in order to not run afoul of the rule. The biggest
problem with basing admission of evidence on the reasonableness of a
forensic step is that police must search all of a suspect's digital property in
order to properly execute a digital property warrant. Assuming that all
physical aspects of the execution of a digital property warrant were reasonable, the only remaining forensic steps would be how police sifted
through the bits and bytes that make up a suspect's digital property. As
previously discussed, there is no Perfect Tool and police have to search all
of the digital property to ensure that no data is hidden. Relying on criminals to not hide information is unwise. Therefore, any forensic step dealing
with the actual search of information stored in digital property will likely
be reasonable.
One intriguing possibility is to limit the plain view doctrine depending on the type of crime being tried. 176 Perhaps the plain view doctrine should be applied to digital evidence relating to murder, but not digital evidence relating to larceny. The challenge with implementing a crimebased plain view filter is that someone will have to determine which
crimes should be exempt from the plain view doctrine. If courts have to
decide which crimes should be subject to digital plain view, then courts
will have to make the decision that the Fourth Amendment only applies
sometimes. Perhaps the legislature should decide which crimes deserve to
be protected from digital plain view. The problem with that is that Congress has an incentive to expand the list over time. 177 Professor Kerr points
out that setting different rules for different crimes may become compli78
cated and that the danger from pretextual searches would still exist.'
Thus, limiting the application of digital plain view to certain crimes is extraordinarily problematic.
Another intriguing possibility is an approach advocated by David
cause:
First, for reasons explored earlier, it may be difficult for courts to identify
exactly when a particular step is reasonable or unreasonable. Second, this
standard would require courts to apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in an unusual context in which the causal connection among steps is
unclear.
Kerr, supra note 2, at 580. The author believes that courts would not have to apply the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine because all forensic steps dealing with the actual sifting of
digital data within digital property are almost certainly reasonable.
176 See Kerr, supra note 2, at 580-82 (building upon the premise set forth by Professor
William Stuntz in Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002), regarding
restricting search practices based on whether a crime is related to terrorism).
177 Kerr, supra note 2, at 581 for a discussion regarding Congressional incentives.
178 Kerr, supra note 2, at 581.
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Ziff. The Ziff approach would only allow plain view digital evidence to be
admitted "if the file's incriminating character becomes immediately apparent before it can be determined that the contents of the file are outside of
the scope of the warrant."' 17 9 Ziffs standard is best applied when the evidence is pictorial in nature, such as child pornography. 180 Less obvious
and equally, or more, heinous crimes are not immediately apparent. Ziff
gives the example of a letter to grandma and states that the Ziff standard
"prohibits the officer from reading the contents of the letter.' 181 A criminal
could easily exploit this limitation by labeling a file "letter to
grandma.doc" and then actually having a letter to grandma with evidence
of criminal activity hidden within. For example, the letter could be written
in code or the criminal information could be at the end of the letter. Better
yet, a criminal could also easily embed objects within a file that contain a
plethora of data or hide the information in the metadata. Ziff's approach
does not appreciate how easy it is to manipulate digital property into something that looks innocuous on the surface. The Ziff standard can easily be
circumvented by hiding data in a number of places within a file and overlaying an innocuous layer, much like spam does today. 182 Additionally, the
"immediately apparent"
standard is almost as subjective as the Tenth Cir83
cuit's standard. 1
Another possible solution is to limit the digital plain view to certain
types of defendants. Perhaps courts could reduce protection from the digital plain view for suspects with felony convictions or non-U.S. citizens.
This solution is limited because it would be difficult to justify restrictions/exceptions based on most other types of categories of a person.
Partial limitations to the conundrum posed by digital plain view results in only partial solutions. All of the methods of partially limiting the
plain view doctrine as applied to digital evidence are flawed in some manner. The only solution left is to completely eliminate the application of the
plain view doctrine to digital evidence.

79 Ziff, supra note 83, at 869.
80 Even in the limited context of child pornography, there are additional complications.

There is virtual child pornography which does not capture the images of real children, there
are adults that look like children, and children that look like adults.
181 Ziff, supra note 83, at 869.
182 See, e.g., Image Spam is Taking Over Inboxes at http://digg.com/
tech news/ImageSpam is Taking Over Inboxes (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
19' Professor Kerr criticized the Ziff approach because (1) some types of evidence are
more apparent than others, and (2) courts have applied the immediately apparent requirement less strictly than the Ziff approach would require. Kerr, supra note 2, at 582.
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C. Completely Eliminatingthe Plain View Doctrinefor DigitalEvidence
Abolishing the application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence is perhaps the most drastic action that can be taken to remedy the
problem of digital property searches turning into general searches. Several
commentators have entertained the notion of abolishing the plain view
doctrine for digital evidence, but those commentators have shied away
from supporting that proposition. 1 4 Some courts also seem hesitant to confront the issue. Other courts seem willing to allow general searches to arise
from application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence. As discussed above, the status quo is unacceptable, as are partial limitations. The
only satisfactory solution is to completely eliminate the application of the
plain view doctrine to digital evidence.
The most compelling reason for eliminating the application of the
plain view doctrine to digital property is that the Fourth Amendment was
created to combat general warrants, yet the digital plain view currently
allows for general searches of a suspect's digital property. Eliminating
digital plain view will help courts avoid the dangers of gauging subjective
intent that the Tenth Circuit has been engaging in. This new standard recognizes that no Perfect Tool, one that returns only the digital evidence that
police are searching for, exists. This approach thus recognizes that criminals will attempt to conceal evidence. Police must comprehensively search
a suspect's digital property in order to properly execute a warrant. In fact,
law enforcement, including the FBI, currently trains its analysts accordingly. 8 5 Eliminating digital plain view creates a bright-line rule that provides a clearer standard for police to apply. This solution obviates the need
to dissemble on the part of police and deters police misconduct. Abolishing digital plain view allows police the most flexibility to conduct forensic
searches of digital property. Police do not have to rely on criminals clearly
labeling or otherwise categorizing their files. This will also provide society
with real protection for their privacy with the added benefit that the law
would be more in line with society's expectations.
Eliminating the plain view doctrine for digital evidence does have
its downsides. Courts would have to distinguish digital property from other
types of property and justify deviation from plain view doctrine precedent
that applies to the physical world. Police would lose a valuable tool that
would allow them to use any evidence of criminal conduct found during a
184E.g., Kerr, supra note 2, at 583 (opining that "[ilt is too early for courts or Congress
to impose such a rule" that would abolish the plain view doctrine); Ziff, supra note 83, at
868. Professor Kerr does not explain why he believes it is too early to abolish the plain
view doctrine.
185Kerr, supra note 2, at 578-79.
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digital property search. Society may suffer from unintended consequences
such as unpunished criminal conduct. Thus far, most digital property plain
view cases seem to involve child pornography and, of course, there is nobody who wants criminal pedophiles to escape justice. Our system is,
however, designed to protect the innocent and, unfortunately, this means
that some guilty parties benefit.
Yet the pros outweigh the cons. The arguments in favor of completely eliminating the plain view doctrine for digital evidence have been
discussed in detail throughout this article. Courts are already applying the
plain view doctrine in a way that permits general searches. 186 The courts
benefit, the police benefit, and the people benefit from the elimination of
the plain view doctrine for digital evidence. This clear standard allows
more consistent application of the law. Police and prosecutors will still be
able to obtain evidence
of malfeasance through independent sources and
87
discovery.
inevitable
We should nip the problem in the bud and not let it develop into a
problem with widespread impacts. Although eliminating digital plain view
is drastic, it is also the only effective way of forestalling the negative effects of the plain view doctrine's application.
VI. CONCLUSION
Digital property is an inextricable part of our lives. Warrants for
digital property are transforming into a species of de facto general warrants because police, by necessity, must perform a comprehensive search
of a suspect's digital property in order to properly execute a digital property warrant. General searches are proscribed by the Fourth Amendment
and thus, are bad. Also, digital plain view increases the risk of pretextual
and "dragnet" searches. The possibility of general searches of digital property is not a hollow threat; courts have already begun to apply the plain
view doctrine in a manner that allows police to use anything found during
a search of digital property as evidence of crimes beyond the scope of the
warrant. Thus, the status quo is unacceptable. This article examined several possible solutions that avoided the elimination of digital plain view,
but those solutions proved deficient. The only complete solution is to
eliminate digital plain view.
The courts, police, and society will all benefit from eliminating the
application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence. Courts will be
able to apply a bright-line rule. Police misconduct will be deterred. Police
186

See supra Part IV.

187 Professor Kerr briefly discusses this. Kerr, supra note 2, at 584.
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will be able to properly execute warrants to search digital property. People's privacy will be protected. Most significantly, the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment and its censure of general searches will be respected.
A forensic specialist once noted: "Most people don't think of the
computer as a continually running tape recorder ...But it is. It's the closest thing we have in our culture to something that's recording our every
thought and every word."' 8 Digital data created by computers and other
electronic devices will continue to record and penetrate more deeply into
our lives. If we do not eliminate the application of the plain view doctrine
to digital evidence, then general searches of digital property birthed by the
plain view doctrine will become more prevalent and more dangerous to
our liberty.

188

Paul Festa and Lisa M. Bowman, Can PC Sleuths Undo Enron Shredding?, CNET

NEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2002, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-829071.html (statement of Joan Feldman, president and founder of Computer Forensics in Seattle). See also,
Kerr, supra note 2 at 569.

